" Etat des jugements rendus en matie ' re civile et commerciale par le Tribunal de province de Se! gou pendant le quatrie ' me trimestre de , Archives Nationales, Re! publique du Mali (hereinafter ANM)  M . This article was originally presented at a conference on ' Imperialism and Identity : Remapping the Cultural Politics of Representation ', held at the University of California, Berkeley, February . This is a preliminary discussion for a proposed longer study tentatively entitled ' Courts and conflicts in the French Soudan,  to  '. I have collected the complete run of all civil disputes brought before the tribunal de province for the districts of Sikasso, Bougouni, Bamako, Segu, Gumbu and Sokolo. I would like to thank the editors of this journal, Chris Lee, William Worger and Emily Osborn for their helpful comments on this article.
# A third question, which falls outside of the discussion for this article, would ask methodological and epistemological questions about the nature and utility of court records derived from the registers of the provincial court for students of African social and legal history. For a preliminary discussion of these issues, see Richard Roberts, ' Text In November , the governor-general of French West Africa enacted a new legal code which provided the blueprint for two parallel systems of justice : one for Frenchmen and Africans privileged to bring their cases before a ' metropolitan ' system of courts ; the other for the vast majority of Africans, whose grievances would be heard before African ' magistrates ' applying ' customary ' law.$ Court records, especially those concerning ordinary disputes over inheritance, divorce, property and contract, are a potentially vast source of evidence on everyday life and social change. But court records are not transparently useful documents for social historians. Historians must learn how these court records were created, how the act of recording shaped the nature of the grievance presented, how African litigants saw these new courts, and how they adapted their grievances to fit what the new courts could hear.% This study is particularly interested in how colonial institutions -such as the new courts that came into existence in  -contributed to changes in the landscapes of power and authority in Africa and how Africans negotiated these new terrains. In using the new courts, women not only acted in their interests, but forced subsequent changes in the landscapes of power in the French Soudan, including French representations of African marriages and the authority of fathers and husbands.
  
By using a term for a physical feature -landscape -to describe the context for studying asymmetrical social relations, this article portrays power as having concrete qualities. To traverse a ' landscape ' requires at least two actions : first, it requires intentionality. A person who seeks to move from and testimony in the Tribunal de PremieZ re Instance, Dakar, during the early twentieth century ', Journal of African History,  (), -, and Richard Roberts, ' Conflicts over property in the Middle Niger valley at the beginning of the twentieth century ', African Economic History,  (), -.
$ See Dominque Sarr and Richard Roberts, ' The jurisdiction of Muslim tribunals in colonial Senegal, - ', in Kristin Mann and Richard Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa (Portsmouth NH, ) and Roberts, ' Text and testimony '. Those Africans considered ' subjects ' of France could not bring their grievances before these courts. Instead, they were directed to ' customary ' courts. For parallels elsewhere in Africa, see Mahmoud Mamdani, Citizen and Subject : Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, ).
% In compiling the registers of court cases, the French colonial officials and African clerks may well have narrowed the expression of grievances into recognizable formula so that they could be ' heard ' -or more precisely, recorded. Thus, the registers may not be an accurate record of what was actually said in the courtroom. David Cohen has described the tensions between what Basoga courts saw as ' appropriate, relevant and correct facts and arguments ' and what litigants and witnesses saw as ' appropriate, relevant and correct '. David Cohen, ' '' A case for the Basoga '' : Lloyd Fallers and the construction of an African legal system ', in Mann and Roberts (eds.), Law in Colonial Africa, . See also James Clifford's discussion of the Mashpee land claim trial, The Predicament of Culture : Twentieth-century Ethnography, Literature and Art (MA thesis, Cambridge University, ). Using court records as historical sources requires that we develop a methodology that subjects these records to critical interpretation of how they were produced and how testimony was shaped by court procedures. point A to point B must prepare both physically and cognitively.& These preparations can be either routine, such as going to the market or the field, or strategic in the sense of anticipating new outcomes or benefits. And second, it requires action. A person must actually set out to accomplish the goals she or he has defined. Intentionality and action do not preclude unanticipated consequences. Indeed, unanticipated consequences are part of the reflective processes of human learning. Thus, linking ' landscape ' to the action of ' traversing ' provides readers with a sense that the men and women of the French Soudan actively engaged with the world in which they lived, and whose actions shaped the meanings of their experience. This article's concern with agency flows from this sense of active engagement with the world and, following Giddens, refers to the ' capability of doing things in the first place '.
To be able to ' act otherwise ' means being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs. This presumes that to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. ' The term ' landscapes of power ' also suggests the uneven nature of the terrain that men and women traversed in order to accomplish their goals. A landscape of power differs from its physical counterpart in terms of historical change. Historians can ' measure ' changes to the landscapes of power in eventful time, and not merely according to natural or geological time.( The landscapes of power during the three or four decades of transition from the late precolonial to early colonial Africa changed very rapidly. Established forms of power and authority were often eroded, only to be replaced by new or re-constituted forms established first by Africans responding to the crises associated with the end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and then by the practices and policies of colonial officials.) During this period, Africans also tested the limits of power, sometimes unleashing ferocious efforts to re-assert the power of those being challenged, often eroding power in the process, and sometimes merely slipping through the cracks opened in the landscapes of power in the aftermath of colonial conquest.* The year  stands as one of these moments of accelerated change : this was the year in which thousands & Cognitive psychology may provide some leads on guiding our understanding of human processes of perception, knowing, learning and problem solving. For a study of cognitive problem solving linked to spatial knowledge, see Mary M. of slaves throughout the French Soudan began to leave their masters and by so doing began the process of ending slavery."! This was also the year when French officials established native courts designed to channel African litigants into new institutions for dispute resolution. The end of slavery and the linked transformations set in motion by slaves' actions and the establishment of new courts altered the landscapes of power in the French Soudan and structured power in new ways. Landscapes of power thus contain physical institutions such as chieftaincy, heads of households and courts as well as social and cultural practices such as kinship, marriage, slavery, labor, leisure, wealth and authority.
These institutions and practices contributed to the structures of everyday life, which are the product of recursive human engagement with the world that establish both ' sets of rules and resources '."" To engage with the world requires cognition and reflection. People produce history through both words and deeds."# Representations of landscapes of power thus have at least two qualities central to the argument presented here. First, representations are intellectual constructions, products of perception and cognition. Perceptions and cognition are unstable in time and over time, reflecting ongoing struggles to shape meaning and experience. And second, as social constructions, representations have significant institutional consequences. They actually influence the structure and performance of institutions and the ways people use them."$ This article thus argues that representations have distinctive histories, but that without attention to how humans act on them or in spite of them, representations are hollow explanations for historical change.
Agency, structure, and representation are germane to the study of colonial courts in the French Soudan because these courts became part of the new landscapes of power and authority that resulted from the encounter between French colonialism and dynamic local processes of change predating conquest. The construction of courts for African subjects took place within the context of intersecting and contradictory forces. Between  and  these included a significant struggle between different models of colonialism, the predominance of lawyers within the middle and senior administration of the Third Republic, the willingness of civilian administrators to tame French soldiers by imposing a ' rule of law ' based upon a cognitive grid of metropolitan principles of dispute settlement, and a willingness to respect ' custom ' assumed to be central to the solidity of pre-modern African societies."% The colonial courts of  were also constructed against the backdrop of the end of slavery, changes in access to resources and challenges to the authority of household heads and chiefs.
When he took office in , Governor-General Ernest Roume pushed for the rapid conclusion of the commission charged with the amalgamation and normalization of justice in French West Africa. Roume's concern about normalizing the colonial legal system was based upon judicial anomalies between metropolitan design and legal practice in the colonies, and upon political struggles centered around competing models of colonialism. The decree of  November  established a federation-wide legal system. The first courts for African subjects in the Soudan were up and running in the spring of .
Almost immediately, the French officials charged with supervising these new native courts were confronted by African women seeking divorce."& The Bamako administrator wrote in third quarter of , just one year after the new courts were established, that ' the incidence of divorce cases is slightly less than last quarter, but nonetheless very frequent. It is almost always the woman who brings the request for divorce before the provincial court '."' The Gumbu administrator in  echoed his Bamako counterpart when he wrote that ' nearly all of the grievances brought before the provincial court during the course of this quarter concerned divorce.'"( Women seeking divorce continued to preoccupy the native courts as late as the First World War. The Mopti administrator wrote in  that ' the principal category of civil process [in the district] are the divorces ; many women come forward to demand the rupture of their marriages '.") Faced with the incidence of women seeking divorce through these new courts, administrators were forced to explain why women were seeking divorce. Some reports identified the ' poor treatment women receive ' and physical abuse. Others described cases where wives were abandoned by their husbands."* French administrators began to construct a model of African families as inherently unstable owing to the lack of women's volition in marriage and the status of African women as beasts of burden, commodities and exploited workers. Drawing upon recent changes in French family law, many colonial officials were inclined to listen to women's grievances and to act favorably in response to their requests for divorce.#! Administrators were also concerned that the incidence of divorce both reflected and contributed to ' familial anarchy '.#" The Gumbu administrator attributed the incidence of divorce to the ' weak bonds attaching the native woman to her new family '.## Linking women seeking divorce to the organization of the African family and to marriage practices, French district administrators developed components of a discourse about African women.#$ The high incidence of divorce, wrote the Koutiala administrator in , was due to the ' conception that the woman is a captive, an instrument of work and of exchange, who can be sold, given away, and repossessed according to the [husband's] whims and means without ever consulting her '.#% The next year, the Koutiala administrator pressed his attack on African marriage by calling them ' disguised sales '.
Under the pretext of marriage, in effect, the exchanges of young girls or women are practiced. In reality, these exchanges are nothing less than disguised purchases and sales. It is thus that one sees young girls, still small children and far too young to be married, taken from their mothers and given by their fathers or some other male relative in exchange for a woman he wants to marry.
In her new milieu, this child is, in reality, considered to be a captive, subject to the capricious demands of her new environment. She is [often] exchanged a second time, either for another woman or for a horse, cattle, or some cowries. In the latter case, under the pretext of bridewealth exchange, this is nothing less than a brutal sale. All the profound troubles that constantly plague the family and result in multiple unhappy consequences can be traced to this [practice] .
The Koutiala administrator argued that those practices masquerading as marriage should be considered ' acts of trade ' in people, which was prohibited by the  December  decree abolishing the trade in slaves and the deprivation of another person's liberty.#&
In a marginal note scribbled on that report, someone from the governorgeneral's office in Dakar responded forcefully to the challenge raised by the #! The most important legislation was the Naquet Law,  ; legislation regarding the protection of minors and child labor laws also influenced how French administrators approached the social problems raised by women seeking divorce.
#" Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice, Bouguni, rd Quarter , ANM  M .
## Rapport sur le fonctionnement des tribunaux indige ' nes, Gumbu, th Quarter , ANM  M  ; also Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indige ' ne, Bamako, nd Quarter , ANM  M . #% Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indige ' ne, Koutiala, nd Quarter , ANM  M .
#& For the latest discussion on the history of French antislavery policy and its social consequences, see Klein, Slavery and Colonial Rule. Koutiala administrator. ' Do not meddle in native custom except with the utmost circumspection. The act of agreement among two families to exchange two women is the guarantee of reciprocity. Marriage, in both Muslim practice and native custom, has all the characteristics of a sale. Do not, however, treat this as an infraction of the slave trade ordinance '. The note suggested that the ' only amelioration ' that should be brought to the practices of marriage is to request that young women ' give their consent '.#' For marriageable women to give their consent was, however, a radical attack on the authority of the household head and threatened the presumed stability of traditional African society.
Already in , Lieutenant-Governor François Clozel ordered all administrators in the French Soudan to complete lengthy surveys on the customs in their districts. That same year, Clozel appointed Maurice Delafosse to be administrator of Bamako and charged him with producing a compendium of African customs. These surveys probably constituted the raw material Delafosse used to construct his magisterial three volume work, Haut-SeT neT gal-Niger, published originally in .#( Volume III contained Delafosse's intellectual effort to distill out of the detail and variety of African customs a framework to help administrators in their oversight of the new colonial legal system and in their role as magistrates in the district-level appeals court. Delafosse's work also provided the ideological template for French colonial native policy based on the presumption of enduring and stable family and political structures.
For Delafosse, the unity of his Soudanese civilizations was that ' the guiding principles of customary law are the same ; the organization of property, the organization of the family, the conception of justice and the state of social and political development are everywhere very analogous at the base and hardly vary in form '.#) The deep reef of commonality in Delafosse's ' Soudanse civilization ' can be found in the organization of property, called le reT gime foncier. ' The customs of the natives of the Soudan appear to differ least in regard to the organization of property than in regard to other branches of civil law, for example, inheritance, marriage, etc.'#* Delafosse recognized the greater variability in family law, but he nonetheless proceeded to define its basic characteristics. These basic features included modes of obtaining a wife, divorce, and polygyny : polygamy is universally recognized through West Africa, even if it is not always practiced … The number of spouses is only limited by the resources of the husband. A large number of spouses is a sign of wealth, but only the rich may so aspire and it is often the case that poor men are monogamous.$! The range of custom, according to Delafosse, was actually quite narrow. He identified only five modes of obtaining a wife, for example. Marriage custom, Delafosse argued, had its origins in economic and domestic needs, but it also served an important social function by channeling male sexual needs. ' Custom wants in so far as possible to stop this potential disturbance [i.e. uncontrolled sexual license] to the family and to society.'$" Whereas Delafosse was concerned with the logic of marriage customs, his contemporary scholar-administrator, Charles Monteil, advanced a major argument about household stability and the household head's authority. In , Charles Monteil, one of the leading scholar-administrators of France's West African empire, published Les Bambara du SeT gou et du Kaarta.$# Monteil based his reconstruction of Bambara history and ethnography on information he collected while serving as a district administrator in Jenne between  and .$$ Monteil had already drafted sections of his book as administrative reports, but the publication of Les Bambara marked the first detailed ethnohistory of the Bambara. Monteil's book, in the words of Maurice Delafosse, ' managed to disentangle the chaos [of Bambara history and ethnography] and substituted a scientific basis upon which it is possible to establish the definitive [interpretation] '.$% For the purposes of this article, Monteil's ethnography of the household provides the most important touchstone. Monteil was particularly interested in the etymology of certain key words, such as the family and the household head. But he read his ethnology through the history of the Bambara kingdom. The rise of the powerful Bambara rulers of Segu was linked sociologically to the foundation of the household head's authority. The power of the Bambara faama was analogous to the faya or power of the fa (household head) simply amplified on the scale of a kingdom.
In the Bambara language, there are no terms equivalent to our word family, understood in a juridical sense. The collectivity placed under the authority of a fa$& is called by different names depending upon how one conceives of the collectivity itself or even the location which that collectivity occupies. Note first of all the collectivity that occurs when one forms an association, that is the ton … and all the people placed under the authority of the fa are considered the ton den [w] l literally, children of the ton … If one considers the family as the association of the people issued from the same relatives, one can employ the term ba-denya, derived from ba-den [w] ; the word ba meaning the mother and more broadly as the genitor mother or father, then the term ba-den [w] indicates those who have issued from them and commonly means children, brothers, relatives and thus ba-denya connotes fraternity and lineage.$'
The key category upholding the authority of the household was his faya. There is a circularity of sorts here -the authority of the household head resides in his status as household head -but that does not alter its importance to Monteil's sociology. ' The whole of the prerogatives of all kinds, which uphold the fa above the others, constitute a form of eminent dignity of which $$ Monteil relied upon the assistance of only two crucial informants, the jeliw or griots, Kare Tammoura and Gran Konate! .
$% Maurice Delafosse, review of Les Bambara, originally published in Afrique française, Mar. , and reprinted in the  edition of Les Bambara, xviii.
$& ' Fa signifies, following the case, seigneur, maıV tre, patriarche, peZ re … It corresponds very well in the family to the lofty and respectable dignity which is reflected in the way Mistral referred to his father : mon seigneur peZ re ou le maıV tre '. Note in original text.
$' Les Bambara, -.
the essence is its omnipotence, faya, which is derived from the status of fa (seigneur, maıV tre)'.$( Monteil subsequently elaborates on the qualities of the faya. ' The powers of the fa over his community are, in principle, absolute. He can, if he chooses, loan, pledge, sell and even put to death [any member of his community] ; he may also dispose of everything that they possess, people and things. In contrast, he has an obligation to sustain the members [of his community] '.$) Central to the authority of the household head were also reciprocal responsibilities, made possible by the collective nature of household property.
The material possessions are indivisible, the fa is obliged to use them for the wellbeing of all the members. It is thus that, when it is due, he provides the bridewealth which permits one of his members to found a family ; he ransoms the members who have fallen into slavery ; he renders care to those who are ill, even if this requires extraordinary expenditures ; he is responsible for all civil or legal or other debts of any of the members of his community …$* According to Monteil's ethnographic sociology of the Bambara household, the power of the household head was absolute and unchallenged. He stood at the head of a complex, multi-generational unit, but it was his capacities to organize and manage that provided the deep stability to African family structures.
Two quite different French representations of African households, marriages and women -the stability of African families based on the authority of the male household-head and the wretchedness of African women in marriage -coincided in the colonial world of the Soudan by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century.%! Acknowledging one or the other of these models had important policy implications because administrators were often called upon to make decisions on competing African disputants' claims for divorce. Of course, there were also African patterns of perception and cognition regarding these new colonial courts. The African discourse is much harder to excavate, although examining how Africans used the new courts provides significant insight into African agency. In making strategic decisions about which court to use to seek resolution of their grievances, Africans were clearly acting on their assessment of ' rules and resources '.
$) Les Bambara, . $* Les Bambara, . %! William Ponty, for long governor of the Soudan, became governor-general of French West Africa in . Drawing upon his own field experience as well as the ideas of Delafosse and Monteil, Ponty elaborated a native policy he termed ' politique des races '. The politique des races sought to build colonialism on a respect for the stability of African social institutions, the genius of which lay in each ethnic group's traditions. Ponty's native policy simultaneously attacked the native aristocracy enshrined through the policies of indirect rule in order to return to the more egalitarian nature of African traditional societies and sought to encourage ' progress ' through education and ethnic self-determination. There were, of course, deep contradictions in Ponty's formulation. See Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize, and Andrew Hubbell, ' Patronage and predation : a social history of colonial chieftancies in a chiefless region, Souroudougou (Burkina Faso), - ', (Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, ).
     : 
Enacted in  and implemented in , the new legal system created two discrete legal systems : one for Europeans and assimilated Africans and the other for African subjects. Europeans and assimilated Africans brought their legal cases before a hierarchy of courts that were virtually identical to those found in France, and where the law and procedure were taken from metropolitan code. Under the  legal code, African subjects brought their cases (if they were engaged in civil suits) or were brought before (if they were subject to criminal cases) a series of native courts with clearly demarcated jurisdictions. The structure of these courts imposed a French template on African litigation.
Civil litigation in French West Africa was supposed to be channeled, as in France, up a hierarchy of courts, each applying stricter procedures in ever wider jurisdictions and each hearing appeals from the one below. The  code established three layers of native courts : the village court, the provincial court and the district court, which acted as the highest appeals court. At the lowest level, the village court was instructed to seek reconciliation between the parties ; at the provincial and district levels, legal judgements would reward winners and punish losers.%" The village court, analogous to the French justice of the peace, was presided by the village chief. If the litigants were not pleased with the village chief's efforts at reconciliation, they were instructed to bring their cases before the provincial court, where the  legislation mandated the composition of the court. The chef de province, the historic or invented indigenous ruler of the region, presided over the affairs of the court, assisted by two assessors nominated by the French district officer. The provincial court was to apply ' custom ' and the assessors were selected from those reputed to be most knowledgeable of community custom. In Muslim regions -or if the litigants were Muslim -at least one of the assessors was to be a qadi or Muslim judge.%# Judgements rendered were to be recorded either in Arabic or in French and the litigants were to be instructed to proceed to the district court if they wished to pursue their appeal. To ensure that the district court was not inundated with unwarranted appeals, a steep fine of  francs was imposed in cases of frivolous litigation.
Governor-general Ernest Roume's  instructions to district administrators charged with implementing these new courts underscored the importance of colonial control over the native courts. ' I am primarily %" The notion of winners and losers is derived from Robert Kidder, ' Western law in India : external law and local response ', in (ed.) Harry M. Johnson, Social System and Legal Process (San Francisco, ). I return to this notion below.
%# Regardless of the explicit instructions that Muslim assessors be appointed to the new courts and that Muslim law as part of Muslim social status be recognized (and despite French bias in favor of ' codified ' Muslim law more generally), Muslims did not rush to the new courts. The Segu commandant noted that ' Muslims manifest a certain apprehension about bringing their grievances before mixed courts ', (Rapport sur le fonctionnement des tribunaux indige ' nes, nd Quarter , Segu, ANM  M ). By mixed, the author meant composed of Muslim and non-Muslim judges. Moreover, a system of Muslim justice existed on the fringes of the French colonial courts well into the s, which was probably the site for much of the adjudication of civil disputes among Muslims. Dennis Galvan, University of Florida, is currently working on Muslim courts in Senegal.
concerned that all decisions rendered by native justice will be controlled by the higher colonial administration and by the head of the judicial service.'%$ Roume had in mind the control both over African ' magistrates ' and colonial officers and provided in the appendix to his instructions a model of what a native court's register should contain. Not all judgements were to be recorded and forwarded to the lieutenant-governors and the West African judicial service. Decisions taken at the village court were ' in general, not to be communicated, because of their large number and little importance '. But this did not, Roume warned, suggest that administrators need not concern themselves with village level disputes and cases. On the contrary, Roume instructed the district officers to control carefully the proceedings at the village level and report all irregularities immediately.
For civil and criminal cases brought before the provincial court, separate registers were to be maintained and submitted in three-month periods. Regarding civil cases, these registers were to contain a ' summary ' description of the grievance, the names, domiciles, and ' customary status ' of the litigants, a description of the judgement rendered, and an indication whether or not the litigants were prepared to pursue an appeal. If they wished, litigants could appeal to the district court, which was presided by the commandant de cercle, the senior French colonial official in the district. He was assisted by two assessors, chosen according to the same criteria as the assessors for the provincial court. The district officer nominated all assessors ; their appointments were made by lieutenant-governors and approved by governor-general by annual decree. The provincial court and the district court were analogous to the tribunal de premieZ re instance and the tribunal de deuxieZ me instance in France.
Criminal cases followed paths determined by the severity of the alleged acts. The French distinguish between deT lits and crimes, which are roughly parallel to misdemeanors and felonies. In West Africa, a simpler distinction was applied. In , Roume wrote that ' this division does not conform to contemporary criminology. Instead, it reflects, in its simplicity, the actual state of morals in the land [i.e. this colony] '. According to Roume, only attempts against human life and acts involving the traffic in people [the slave trade] were considered serious enough to warrant the term ' crimes '. Less serious acts against people and those against goods, ' generally of little importance in the state of native property ', may be defined as misdemeanors.%% The village court had authority over a very small set of infractions ; that of the province heard most misdemeanors. Felonies were heard only by the district court, subject to review by the chambre de homologation of each colony. This court of verification was charged with assessing whether sentences were proportionate to the crimes and whether courts had followed required procedure. The court of verification was activist, often annulling sentences and sending cases back to be retried. All cases could be appealed up the court ladder. Criminal cases were also referred to as ' correctional ' because they were subject to penal and capital sentences. Although the native legal system was designed to channel civil litigation along a path the French seemed to understand well enough, it was not the intention of the French architects of the colonial legal system to require that Africans conform exactly to French metropolitan legal procedure. ' Procedure,' Roume wrote in ,
should not be taken in the same sense as it has in the judicial language of the Metropole, where the term evokes the feelings of difficulties, complications, delays, delaying tactics, nullities and costs incompatible with the simplicity of native justice. Procedure, in this case, is limited to verbal or written formalities strictly indispensable for the rapid and free solution of grievances and appropriate to the state of rudimentary social conditions [in the colony] without prejudicing the interests of the litigants. No special form is prescribed for appearing before a competent court.%& Moreover, Roume reiterated that all legal proceedings were to be open to the public unless the publicity surrounding a case might endanger public order and morals.
The very structure of the native legal system, the presence of written registers, the possibility of appeals, the categorization of cases into separable civil, commercial and criminal issues, and even the modification of legal procedure to ' fit ' African conditions nonetheless reflected the imposition of a grid of Western legal institutions on African grievances. This program of creating a colonial legal order in French West Africa was further complicated because of the privileged place ' custom ' was to play in the decisions taken by the native courts.
Governor-general Merlin did not fully understand the fluid and contested nature of custom and the opportunities opened to African litigants with the establishment of these new courts when he sent instructions to the district officers of the Soudan in . ' Guarantee to the natives under our control and under our authority, in all which is not contrary to our essential principles of humanity and civilization, the maintenance of their customs, the foundation of private law appropriate to their mentality and to their social state '. Merlin further complicated the task of implementing a colonial legal system since he assumed that ' custom ', like metropolitan code-law, was continuously evolving.
Our firm intention to respect customs does not establish an obligation to restrain progress, nor the regularization and amelioration of custom. With the assistance of the native courts themselves, it will be possible to bring to them, little by little, a rational classification, a generalization of compatible practices [increasingly in line with] not our metropolitan judicial doctrines, but the fundamental principles of natural rights, the fount of all legislation.%'
The program for implementing this colonial legal system, which at once ' respected ' custom but also sought to channel African grievances into Western legal categories and legal assumptions had unforeseen consequences.
%& Roume, Justice indigeZ ne, . %' Governor-general Merlin, Instructions aux administrateurs de la Se! ne! gambie-Niger sur l'application du De! cret du  Novembre  portant re! organisation du Service de la Justice, Gore! e, October , ANM  M .
African women, in particular, saw new opportunities to gain more control over their own lives by addressing themselves to the new courts.
     :  
The first of the new courts began operating in the middle of . Within two years, some patterns of African use of the new legal system were identifiable. In Bouguni district, where the new courts started operating in September , the district administrator wrote that ' natives present themselves before the courts for grievances of little importance : tensions within households, incompletely paid bridewealth and so forth. Others come to complain of acts committed before our occupation, and especially during the time of Samory '. By the end of the year, the administrator noted a further narrowing of the range of cases brought before the courts. ' All the affairs presented deal with household quarrels : husbands abandoned by their wives ; wives abandoned by their husbands ; or bridewealth incompletely paid '.%( More striking was how quickly African litigants manipulated the legal sysem for their own ends. Already by , Africans were by-passing the village court in favor of bringing their cases directly before the French administrator -presumably at the district court (but possibly at the provincial court if the African assessors were not yet in place). During the first years of their operation, French administrators directly supervised the provincial courts' deliberations. ' The natives prefer to come to the district headquarters, and each day the administrator must listen to numerous litigants who talk at length about their domestic quarrels '.%) This strategic use of the new courts took place throughout the French Soudan. From Jenne district, the administrator wrote that in  the number of cases brought before the village courts were surprisingly small. Instead of seeking the assistance of the village chief in reconciling their differences, ' the parties prefer to submit their grievances before the provincial court, thinking that at the district headquarters, they will find a more impartial jurisdiction. Instead, they find that they are sent back to the village courts, which are competent to hear their cases '. Nonetheless, he noted that the provincial court ' heard a great number of cases, many more civil cases than criminal ones '.%* That African litigants wanted to avoid the ' reconciliation ' of the village chief's court and sought instead a more ' impartial ' judgement hints at two important aspects of their strategies in these early years of the new legal system : first, African litigants calculated the outcomes they were likely to receive at different courts. The women who brought their grievances to the provincial court were not interested in the chief's efforts to reconcile them to their husbands. The village chief was, after all, one of the elderly males of the community. Second, they sought not just ' impartial ' judgements, but decisive judgements. An indication of this second point is presented in the %( Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indige ' ne, rd Quarter , Bougouni, ANM  M  ; Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indige ' ne, th Quarter , Bougouni, ANM  M . %) Rapport sur le fonctionnement des tribunaux indige ' nes, rd Quarter , Bougouni, ANM  M . %* Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice, nd Quarter , Jenne, ANM  M .
 remark by the Bamako district administrator. Seventeen disputes, he noted, were brought by ' parties soliciting from the court an arbitrary sentence as well as a condemning one '.&! These patterns are reminiscent of those described by Robert Kidder when the British imposed courts applying Western legal practices in colonial India. Kidder identified several features of Indian colonial courts and their legal procedures that altered the way grievances were handled and expressed. Because colonial courts in India sought to resolve cases based on clearly defined rights, these courts rewarded winners and punished losers. By creating an arena in which decisions awarded were ' decisive ', the new courts developed a ' speculative air ' especially for those with the least to lose and the most to gain.&"
The administrators in the French Soudan noted exactly this kind of ' speculative air ' in cases brought by those with the least to lose and the most to gain. Moreover, this search for ' decisive ' judgements, suggesting that the litigants did not wish to be reconciled, was even more pronounced in the case of women seeking divorce. Already in , the Bamako administrator saw this as a trend. ' Most of the cases submitted to the provincial court in civil and commercial matters are concerned with divorce or the repayment of bridewealth. It is to be remarked that in this regard, it is almost always the women who demand the dissolution of the marriage '.&#
      
In , the French published a guide to a handful of ethnically distinct customary laws.&$ In that collection, Alfred Aubert, the administrator from Bouguni, cautioned the Western reader about how easy it was to misunderstand Soudanese marriage patterns. How marriage is negotiated, the exchange of goods and services as bridewealth, divorce and so forth, he noted, ' appear to us as strange. The reverse is also true. African workers [who have] returned from France recount how women buy men and they describe the ceremonies in our churches and the clothes of the newlyweds '.&% Aubert's relativism was a far cry from the views of the French administrators who first established the new courts in . The Bamako commandant sought to explain why adulteries in  constituted fully one third of all the misdemeanors judged by the provincial court. One must not see in adulteries, he noted, bridewealth, by her father or brother who has paternal power over her … Once arranged, the bride is never consulted regarding her antipathies, the disproportion of ages, or the incompatibility of character. One only examines the amount of the bridewealth.
The social condition of the married woman is thus very close to that of servitude : the most arduous work is given to her, she is often beaten. It is not necessary to search for passion in adultery ; instead, it is simply the actions of a servant seeking a less onerous master.&& The Bamako administrator did not disguise his sympathies. He also understood how strategic women's action could be in seeking to change their conditions. Some, but not all, Bambara communities regarded adultery as sufficient cause for divorce.&' Moreover, marriage and the dissolution of marriage were rather more complicated than the Bamako administrator recognized. The meaning of marriage in the French Soudan is also a much larger topic than can be entered into here.
For the purposes of this article, I will suggest that the central component of marriage, particularly among the Bambara, whose practices have permeated widely in the area examined here, are the strategic investments made between those kinship groups entering into the marriage contract. These strategic investments -' the circulation of goods and personnel in social streams ' -revolve around building and maintaining webs of kinship and in organizing and controlling labor.&( Marriage certainly builds kinship between groups. It also creates conditions for the generation of recognized descendants : children. Marriage also transfers to her husband and his kinship group rights to his wife's labor, her reproductive power and rights of sexual access. In a recent ethnography, Toulmin describes Bambara marriage as ' a particularly long term investment. While the woman's labour and services provide some immediate returns for the heavy wedding costs, many of the benefits will accrue over the following  years of more.' Toulmin further notes that because the consequences of marriage are likely to be with the family for decades, care in making marriage choices are not left to the potential spouses. Spouses often come from groups already bound by existing marriage ties. ' In this way, the household head hopes to ensure that marriages endure and are free of conflict '.&) && Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indige ' ne, May , Bamako, ANM  M . Adultery blurred the lines between civil and correctional jurisdictions and needs to be teased out more fully.
&' Aubert and Ortoli in Maupoil, Coutumiers juridiques, list adultery as a cause for divorce. In his detailed study of Bambara marriage in the Dioila area, Rene! Luneau (' Le mariage coutumier dans la socie! te! Bambara : Les traditions du village de Beleko (Mali) ', unpublished diplo# me de l'EPHE, Vie ' me section, Paris, , ) does not count adultery as sufficient cause for divorce ; he sees it as grounds for husbands to seek damages from the adulterer. Jane Collier's excellent discussion of adultery in While marriage is surrounded by significant ritual involving coming of age for the bride, the ceremony is merely the culmination of a complex set of transfers known as bridewealth.&* Pre-colonial Bambara marriage involved exchange marriage, although by the beginning of the twentieth century, bridewealth had come to represent the exchanges of other ' equivalences '.'! Bridewealth involved the transfer over a number of years of goods (grain, livestock and cash) and services (weaving and occasional farm work) flowing from the husband's kin to those of his bride. In return, the husband and his kin group received the rights to the bride's labor power (at least for that portion of the day customarily devoted to household chores and other activities that contributed to the well-being of the household, such as farming and weeding, spinning, etc), her reproductive power, and her domestic services. Within the framework of the tightly structured gender division of labor, women also had access to income from work within their own ' economic spheres ', which they controlled independently of their husband's income. Although women had customary rights to enjoy the product of their own labor during their ' leisure ' times, men could still lay claim on their wives' wealth under a claim for supporting the general good of the household.'" Bridewealth constituted not only a significant investment, but represented also a considerable flow of goods between households, permitting further marriages.'# Given the obligations of household heads to provide a wife for each of their sons, it was unlikely for household heads to accumulate bridewealth payments. Thus, the more or less continuous circulation of bridewealth served as a major barrier against divorce, which often required that the bride's family return the bridewealth it had received. Toulmin describes contemporary practice which probably also reflected earlier times.
A woman who is unhappy with her husband can return to her parents and try to persuade them that she should not be forced to go back to him. This is usually not successful, as the girl's father knows that the stability of the unions into which he and his brothers have entered would be upset by his taking the side of his daughter in this case. In addition … the husband may try to get back part of the money he has given to the girl's family. This will be difficult for the bride's father to return, since the money will have been paid over a number of years and spent as it was received.
Toumlin reports that official divorce among the Bambara is very low and ' people, when asked, will say that it hardly ever occurs '.'$ '# Cases involving incompletely transferred bridewealth regularly appear in the court records. Marriage disputes are thus simultaneously about marriage and contracts.
'$ Toulmin, Cattle, Women and Wells, ,  respectively. Luneau makes the same point : ' Mariage coutumier ', -.
Nonetheless, divorce was recognized in the past as in the present if the wife committed adultery, if she aborted a pregnancy, if she was infertile, if she abandoned her children or if she heaped abuse on her husband's kin. Divorce was also possible if the husband was impotent, if he abandoned his family or if he was abusive. In all these cases, the bridewealth was to be returned. Only if the husband repudiated his wife, as was the accepted Muslim practice, was bridewealth not returned.'% Given the barriers against divorce and the peculiar ways in which women had little choice about marriage and marriage partners, the reports from the first few years of the native courts are all the more surprising. What, therefore, was the meaning of the high incidence of woman-initiated divorce in the French Soudan at this time ?'&
, ,  
The establishment of a colonial legal system replete with native courts in  was part of a set of wider transformation in the landscapes of power and authority in the French Soudan. Colonial administrators liked to claim credit for the ' progress ' in the administration of native justice. But they often only saw part of a much more radical transformation. It is not clear how much of this more radical transformation the French actually understood, as suggested by the following passage, which appeared in a  report, regarding the ' education ' of African magistrates who sat on the provincial court in Sikasso.
The judges are chosen from among the members of the old native court, who are regularly re-elected because of the care they bring to their duties and of their detailed understanding of the mores and customs of the different people in the district. Their prestige among the populations is still considerable. They have shown themselves to be curious about our formal institutions [of justice] and respectful of the counsels given them. Little by little and without violence [i.e. radical change] the blacks adapt certain essential modifications to their personal status and to the system of sanctions against misdemeanors.
Our task of education is much more delicate in the area of civil disputes, which also see undeniable amelioration. Thus, in the cases of marriage and divorce, we have brought the judges to the point where they take into consideration the personal wishes of the women, whom one rarely consulted during the previous state of things. The results we have obtained in such little time are much appreciated, and the manner in which we understand justice will contribute significantly to our ability to win over the populations [of the colony]. '' In his report on the functioning of the native courts for the first three months of , the Segu district administrator noted, with only the briefest commentary, the following :
'% Ortoli, ' Coutume Bambara ', - ; Aubert, ' Coutume Bambara ', - ; Toulmin, Cattle, Women and Wells, .
'& Of course, Toulmin's description reflected a normative bias in the nature of her ethnographic data. Real life was certainly different. By high incidence, I refer to the prominence of divorce cases in the court records and to contemporary colonial administrators' perceptions.
'' Rapport sur le fonctionnement de la justice indige ' ne, st Quarter , Sikasso, ANM  M .
The court of the province judged  different civil and commercial cases during this quarter. The largest majority deal with requests for divorce and restitution of bridewealth. It should be noted, however, that almost all of the requests for divorce are brought by women, who often give no reason for their actions except their desire to leave the conjugal domicile. Previously, the cause for divorce was abandonment of one or the other spouse.'( This is a remarkable statement, suggesting a significant change in the meanings of marriage and divorce. It also indicates a significant empowerment of women and their efforts to end marriages which did not work for them.') These two quotes indicate the simultaneous cracking of the patriarchal power ( faya) from two sides. The first crack came with the implementation of a new set of institutions designed to regularize the application of justice in French West African colonies. The very institutions of this new legal order undercut the power of elderly men over their wives and daughters. As much as the French seemed to want to respect custom, they were guided by what they understood as natural human rights, which were sharply influenced by the French Revolution (which provided women with avenues to seek divorce), the maturing Napoleonic Code in France during the course of the nineteenth century (which closed many of these avenues) and the movement to promote women's rights during the Third Republic (which again allowed women to sue for divorce). For most of the nineteenth century, French women had few rights to initiate divorce. This changed when the anticlericalism of the Third Republic coincided with the emerging women's rights movement and resulted in the Naquet Law of . For the first time since the heady days of the Revolution, French women could initiate divorce proceedings against their husbands on the grounds of abandonment, adultery, grievous injury or criminal conviction.'* The timing between changes in the metropolitan legal code and the drafting of the  colonial legal code are not accidental. Crucial here, however, was French willingness to ' listen ' to women in the new courts and to ' respect ' their wishes. This suggests a significantly different pattern from the one Chanock and Ranger have described for British Central Africa, where the ' invention ' of tradition '( Rapport sur le fonctionnement des tribunaux, st Quarter , Segu, ANM  M .
') There has been very little work on the meaning of marriage in Mali. Ethnographies describe marriage structures, but they do not capture the meanings the participants, especially the women, attach to them. There is, for example, no comparable study to Mary Smith's Baba of Karo : A Woman of the Muslim Hausa (New Haven, ), which is remarkable in its presentation of the life history of a Muslim Hausa woman. In a study focusing on the Bambara village of Kala, Camilla Toulmin writes of women's expectations : ' For women, marriage should provide a secure position where, with hard work and successful child-rearing, they will achieve a respected old age. As they grow older, they will hope to be surrounded by daughters-in-law to ease their burden of work, and a horde of grand-and great-grand-children to teach and mock their toothlessness ' Cattle, Women and Wells, . Toulmin's view is not congruent with women seeking divorce as described in this paper. and custom bolstered the power of elderly men.(! The second crack came when women actually used the new courts to bypass the power of the village chief and their own kin to seek divorces, which were frequently granted.
The connections between divorce and the new distribution of power associated with the native courts form only a part of the wider context in which women increasingly took their husbands to court to seek divorce. If the discussion ended here, it would leave the impression that women were merely waiting for a new institutional venue to express their grievances over their domestic arrangements. In other words, the new courts empowered women to act on existing grievances. But this may not have been the case. We have no way of knowing whether or how long women had harbored the kinds of grievances they brought before the native courts in the years following . Another way of phrasing the question is to ask whether there were other changes in the wider social and economic context in the French Soudan which may have contributed to the propensity women had to bring domestic grievances before African and French magistrates who sat on the new courts ?
The answer to this question draws us away from the native courts and into the changes in social life occurring in the first few years of the twentieth century. I have elsewhere described these changes as linked sets of transformations set in motion by the end of slavery and French policies.(" French conquest of the Soudan began in  with the French occupation of Bamako and ended with the capture of Samori and Babemba of Kenedugu in . By , the French had effectively monopolized political and military violence in the region, thus ending the political economy of warrior states which had dominated the region for over three centuries. The end of warrior states led to a dramatic expansion of the continental economy of West Africa, providing new opportunities for African producers of ecologically specialized commodities. It also led to the drying up of new sources of slaves, who had been central both to the pre-colonial economy and to the expansion of the economy during the first two decades of colonial rule. Slave owners in the Soudan responded to the increasing demand for grain, cloth, and dried fish and onions by encroaching on the customary limits on slave use, which had contributed, in part, to the persistence of slavery.(# Moreover, the regions from which many slaves had originally come, those where Samori, Tieba and Babemba had been active, were now ' pacified '. Some slaves decided to leave their masters and return home.
The French were initially ambivalent about what they termed the ' slaves' exodus '. They were anxious to encourage the expansion of the economy, in which slaves played a major role, but they were obliged to respect the liberty of the slaves. French anti-slavery policy in West Africa had since  harbored this ambivalence between respecting natural rights and respecting customs. Governors-general Ponty's, Merlin's and Roume's instructions regarding implementing the new judicial system of French West Africa all underlined the new disposition that the status of slavery could not be invoked in the new native courts.
As I have said and repeated often, we will not tolerate the continuation, under our authority, of certain customs contrary to our principles of humanity and natural justice. It is within this order of ideas that the native courts will not be permitted to recognize litigation relating to the status of slavery, a status which we do not legally recognize. The courts will no longer regulate differences submitted to them regarding the fictional (pretended) qualities of slave in opposition to free.($ The French did not actually abolish slavery ; instead, by denying slavery a legal status, they effectively eliminated the support of the state for slavery and thus gave slaves ' rights ' to leave their masters. In December , Governor-general Roume made the deprivation of anyone's liberty by enslavement and the traffic in people deprived of their liberty illegal. Together, the two decrees of  and  tied the French administrators' hands and led to the widening spirals of slaves leaving their masters throughout the French Soudan from  to .(% The districts addressed in this article -Bamako, Segu, Jenne, Bouguni and Sikasso -were sites of significant emigration and immigration of former slaves. The impact of ex-slaves' departures and their efforts to resettle were complex and uneven throughout the region. In some areas, particularly along the Sahel and in parts of the Jenne, Segu and Bamako districts, the end of slavery left many formerly flourishing areas scrambling for workers. Some former masters turned to their own household labor, especially their wives and their children, to make up for the departure of their slaves. Some former slaves, who had gained skills in various occupations, continued to practice them as independent producers, thus contributing to the erosion of ethnic boundaries over economic resources.
The period from  to  thus witnessed a considerable reshuffling of economic, social and cultural practice. This reshuffling -the linked sets of transformation -may have contributed to household tensions as husbands sought to extract greater effort from their wives at exactly the same time when new economic opportunities (a booming economy and the erosion of ethnic boundaries over economic resources) may have permitted women and men to enter new forms of social production outside of the household. Within this context, women seeking divorce is certainly indicative of women's efforts to define for themselves a greater part of their own future.

When Baia Bari sought divorce from her husband, Tiemoko Boare! , in October , she cited mistreatment as her cause. Baia Bari told the court that she was prepared to reimburse Tiemoko Boare! herself for the bridewealth he had given her paternal kin. She also wanted the court to help her recover , cowries she claimed Tiemoko Boare! had taken from her. Baia Bari's willingness to bring her husband before one of the new courts, which had just been established, and her statement that she was prepared to reimburse her husband for the bridewealth he paid are two very remarkable actions. This article has discussed how the implementation of the new courts and the inclinations of the French to ' listen ' to women's grievances empowered women to bring forward cases regarding domestic conflicts. This article has also suggested that the incidence of divorce in the new court's register of cases should be understood as part of the wider changes occurring throughout the French Soudan as part of the linked set of transformations associated with the transition to colonial rule. This article has also proposed the use of the concept ' landscapes of power ' both to describe and interpret the constitution of forces and the emergence of opportunities that led women like Baia Bari to bring suits for divorce before the newly established native courts of the French Soudan. These landscapes of power were analogous to physical landscapes because their terrain was often uneven and to traverse them required both intentionality and action. The unevenness of the terrain of landscapes of power came from both institutional forms of power in the shape of chiefs, household heads, colonial administrators and courts as indicated in this article and through structures created through the recursive human engagement with the world through action, cognition, reflection and representation. The three decades leading up to the establishment of the new court system in the French Soudan in  witnessed an accelerated period of change to the landscapes of power in that region.  stands out as a moment of particular transformation because it marks the beginning of the waves of slaves' departures that set in motion the linked changes associated with the end of slavery. The evidence of African women seeking divorce through the newly established native courts must be set within this context.
The most persuasive criticism against the use of court records comes most recently from Barbara Cooper, who argues that the court records ' may overdraw the importance of formal institutions of mediation such as colonial courts in recasting the nature of marriage and gender in Africa '.(& Cooper is here concerned with assessing the power of formal legislation and institutions to change the nature of marriage in Maradi. Cooper challenges us to think of marriage not as a fixed institution, but one that has changed in relationship to political economy, urbanization, class and Islamic practices. Cooper argues that most women in troubled marriages sought reconciliation and not divorce, and they had access to a wide variety of informal as well as formal means to bring pressure on their husbands to change their behavior. Cooper also argues that most of the divorces in Maradi, which had very high incidence of divorce in any case, were pronounced following Muslim law by men or taken before the various qadi and chiefs' courts. Cooper concludes that the ' colonial court system does not in reality provide women with any power they do not already have, and can have a number of undesirable side effects, one of which, as I have said, is a dissolution of the marriage without any real effort at reconciliation '.(' One of the strengths of Cooper's study is her rich oral history, but it is a history with a relatively shallow time depth. Few of her informants had recollections of the period anterior to . For those of us interested in the early colonial period, a period for which our informants' memories may not reach and over subjects that they would like to forget, historians may have greater need to use sources that are certainly incomplete.(( Cooper is absolutely right to warn us not to over-emphasize the data collected by colonial officials. Colonial courts never displaced other fora for dispute resolution in Africa and probably most Africans sought to resolve their disputes outside of colonial institutions. By their very presence, however, colonial courts altered the landscapes of power by providing new opportunities for disputants to seek resolution of their grievances. From the moment of their establishment in the French Soudan, court records indicate that some people actually brought their cases before the colonial courts.
The registers of the provincial court provide data on grievances, and these grievances can serve as an entry point for a more detailed study, not only of how the litigants came to come before the court, the subject of this article, but also about patterns of wider social change. The annotations in the registers are sparse, but they may well be precious shards of evidence that historians can use to reconstruct the detail of everyday life, evidence for which is not available from other kinds of sources, written or oral.

This study examines the relationship between the establishment of a new system of native courts in the French Soudan in  and how African women responded. French colonial administrators charged with overseeing the operation of these courts were surprised with the number of women seeking divorce. Two different interpretations of why African women sought divorce from these new courts circulated during the early colonial period influencing the practice of the courts and native policy more generally. One explained the high incidence of women seeking divorce in the wretched condition of women in marriage ; the other interpreted divorce as undermining the authority of the household head and the stability of the family. This study advances the concept of ' landscapes of power ' to describe and interpret the constitution of forces and the emergence of opportunities that led women to seek divorce from the new native courts. The establishment of these new courts altered the landscapes of power by providing new opportunities for disputants to seek resolution of their grievances. The study concludes with an assessment of the evidence found in court registers and argues for the need to link evidence derived from court cases to wider social changes occurring within the French Soudan. 
